What brings credit and prestige to a nation in the eyes of its citizens? Taking a multi-dimensional approach, we investigate national pride in the country's science, economy, arts and literature, and sport. Data from the International Social Survey Programme's  nation 'National Identity' module (N=,) show that people throughout the developed world feel national pride in all these things, contrary to most globalization hypotheses. Pride in the economy shows the most variation among nations, and pride in science also varies greatly, while pride in the arts and literature and in sport vary less. Regression analyses show that linkages of pride to national attachment also vary cross-culturally: pride in science is more consequential in English-speaking countries but pride in arts less consequential; pride in sports matters especially in smaller nations; and pride in economic achievements matters everywhere.
The fact that national feelings do not appear to be on the decline, and that there seems to be substantial variation among nations in the intensity of the feelings, make examining these matters in more detail a matter of some urgency.
D  N P Several of these diverse hypotheses agree in suggesting that national feelings may be multidimensional (Guillén , Kelley and Evans a, Meyer et al. ) , a possibility that gains additional plausibility from the demonstrated multidimensionality of national identity (Evans c, Hjerm , Jones and Smith ).
3 For example pride in the nation's armed forces might be uncorrelated with pride in the arts and literature, or with pride in fair treatment of diverse social groups. Alternatively, the view of the civilizing process as being the dominant trend (Elias ) would suggest that there might be an evolutionary transition from pride in the military and in history to pride in the economy and, subsequently, to pride in the arts and sciences.
Accordingly, it makes sense to examine many aspects of national pride in a diverse group of nations, and to assess whether levels of these different aspects of pride differ among cultural and linguistic groups (as the persistent-differences hypothesis would suggest) or whether they vary along a development dimension (as the civilizing-process hypothesis suggests). Moreover, on the argument that people have both feelings of belonging to a country (closeness) and feelings of pride or its absence (Bollen and Medrano ) , it makes sense to investigate how strong are the links between different aspects of pride and feelings of closeness to one's country.
What aspects of national pride should be considered? At these early stages of discovery, a rather eclectic collection would seem best, beginning with concepts that work cross-nationally. 4 
 Pride in science
Nations have been trying to inculcate positive feelings by co-opting individual achievements in science, adventure, and sport for at least two centuries. Consider, for example, governmental sponsorship of aviation contests and polar exploration at the beginning of the twentieth century (Palmer ) or the space race at mid-century. The civilizing-process hypothesis suggests that national pride in science will increase with economic development. Similarly, the postmaterialistvalues hypothesis would suggest that pride in science will be stronger in countries that have satisfied basic material needs. 5 Alternatively, science may be an especially attractive vehicle for national feeling in multi-ethnic countries because it does not privilege any particular cultural group (Kelley ) and is associated with ethnic tolerance (Evans d) .
By contrast, the globalizing-institutions hypothesis suggests that science and technology are by nature universal, and hence have a strong tendency to become linked to cross-national networks and supra-national organizations (Meyer et al. ) . This suggests that people will not derive much national pride from the achievements of their local scientists, so national pride associated with science will generally be low. Moreover, economic development should increasingly sap national pride in science, as richer countries' science is sucked into a supranational culture.
 Pride in the economy
Because economic success varies greatly, so too should national pride in the economy. 6 In the formerly Communist nations, discovery of their relative poverty was recent and shocking, so we expect them to take little pride in their economies (Miller et al. ) . The civilizing-process hypothesis suggests that pride in the economy should be one of the things replacing pride in the military, so there should be a positive association between pride in the economy and economic development. 7 By contrast, a postmaterialist approach (Inglehart , ) suggests that national pride in the economy decreases with economic success. In this view, people first satisfy their most basic needs and then take that gratification for granted while they set their sights on new aesthetic, social, and knowledgeoriented goals (Maslow ) . As the economy prospers, people will come to take it for granted and cease to take pride in it.
 Pride in sport
Much sport is organized internationally; international sport attracts vast audiences; and competitive games between localities date back into antiquity. Moreover, the glorification of the human body and the very brief durations of most modern sporting events are in tune with today's post-Victorian attitudes and short attention spans (Giddens ) . Hence, to the extent that national 5 From a world-wide perspective, all the countries available in the survey data we use have satisfied basic material needs except the Philippines and perhaps Russia where some live in genuine, life-threatening poverty. 6 The hypothesis that pride in the economy stimulates national feeling and cohesion underlies the use of economic sanctions in international relations, and derives some support from analyses of country-level data showing that financial sanctions do tend to lead target regimes to alter their behaviour (Dashti-Gibson et al. ) .
7 Moreover, the civilizing process hypothesis implies a negative association between pride in the military and pride in the economy. feelings need to build on mechanical solidarity, sports would seem to offer good materials (Gellner ) . As a result, we expect pride in sport to be relatively high in all nations. Prior research and theory also suggests some international differentiation, specifically that small nations are especially proud of their sport (Evans b) , arguably because the organization of international sport through the Commonwealth Games, the Olympics, and similar fora ensures that they are represented as equal with large countries and thereby receive international recognition that they could not otherwise achieve (Malcolm ) . Alternatively, sporting successes might be especially important to the sense of nationhood in new countries that lack a rich heritage of common memories (Renan ), implying a negative association of pride in history and pride in sport. If the civilizing-process hypothesis is correct, then pride in sport should be one of the things replacing pride in the military, so there should be a growth of pride in sport with socioeconomic development, and a negative association between pride in the military and pride in sport.
 Pride in arts and literature
According to the civilizing-process hypothesis, the arts and literature should be gaining prominence as vehicles of national feeling, with people in more developed countries taking more pride in them.
8 But whether the arts are defined as national is problematic and probably depends both on traditions and on historically specific coincidences of interests of national elites, artists, and art consumers. Pride in the arts and literature may be weaker in the new nations, since they have had less time to produce a heritage of these things; but local elites may be successful in attaching pride to pre-cursor heritages or in redefining works of art or literature as nation-specific (Kiely et al. ) . Postmaterialism implies a positive association between actual economic performance and pride in the arts and literature-only those who have achieved economic success will develop widespread national feelings about aesthetic matters. Literature may be less important to national feelings in countries that have a shared language with other countries, because the country's claim to the literature is less exclusive (Bader , Corse , Moulin ). Non-comparable areas, for example poetry, may be especially good for small states (Matthews , Waldstreicher ).
 Other sources of national pride
We provide a detailed investigation of these areas of pride, and set them in context with a more cursory investigation of other zones of national pride: (a) the military because of its traditional association with the modern nation-state; (b) the redistribution system because it is one of the key things that the nation-state does (although the scope of duty of the state towards its poorer citizens and the scope of its rights to extract wealth from its prosperous citizens remains controversial, and the role that contentment with this plays in national feeling is unclear) (Isaac ); (c) the country's political role, both how democracy works at home; and (d) the nation's political influence abroad; (e) equality of opportunity, the country's fair and equal treatment of all members of its society; and (f) the nation's history. 9 Each of these zones of national pride deserves a full investigation on its own, but the four we focus on seem to be a reasonable place to begin.
C A  N P
Extensive survey evidence suggesting that globalization has not eroded national identity, and renewed interest in cultural differences (e.g., Knudsen , Landes ) make it important to pursue the hypothesis of persistent cultural differences in national pride. What culture areas one can examine depend on data availability; ours are limited to Europe and its overseas extensions, plus two Asian countries.
The Nordic countries 10 are expected to be proud, but moderately so, in most domains (Allardt ) . Having concentrated their postwar energies on economic redistribution in a democratic framework (Esping-Andersen , Knudsen ), we would expect them to be very proud of their democratic systems, proud of their economies, and proud of their redistribution (social security) systems. Although they had a very bellicose past in Viking days, and an aggressively militaristic monarchy into the eighteenth century, their twentiethcentury orientation has had a decidedly anti-military slant (Thompson ) .
The Germanic countries 11 should be especially proud of their arts and literature (Giesen ) in view of the tremendous and continuing international influence of their music in the Baroque, Classical, and early Romantic periods-few can boast the like of Bach, Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven (e.g. Ballantine , DeNora ).
12 For Germany and Austria, the painful history of the Second World War is expected to linger as especially low pride in the military. The great energy and determination that these countries devoted to rebuilding their post-World War II economies is expected to show up in high levels of pride in their economies, and high levels of pride in their redistribution (social security) 9 Pride in history may surprise outsiders, reflecting the history that is taught in government schools rather than the history the rest of the world perceives (Schuman and Corning , Zajda ) . 10 Sweden and Norway are the countries in our dataset. For brevity, we sometimes refer to them as the 'Scandinavia' or the 'Nordic countries' although neither Finland nor Denmark is in the dataset.
11 This includes Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands (meaning that the Dutch language has its origins as a Germanic dialect, not that modern Dutch people speak modern High German).
12 Their most obvious rival, Italy, is also expected to take great pride in its arts and literature.
system. We have grouped the former East Germany in the German-language group, both () because their cultural roots are there and the Communist period did not erode their identity as Germans (Phillips ) , and () because West German generosity greatly eased their transition beyond Communism (Dalton ).
We would expect the post-Communist countries 13 to be especially lacking in pride in their economies, both because of a sense of betrayal in that economic stagnation undermined Communism's central claim to be providing prosperity for all (Dalton ) and because they were still actually very poor in the mid-s. Research on subjective well-being suggests that the economic difficulties were causing hardship, but that this did not contaminate positive feelings in other domains of life (Titma et al. ) . Moreover, economic difficulties have not reduced democratic aspirations here (Evans and Whitefield ), so it may not reduce attachment to the nation either. By contrast, pride in the arts, in history, and perhaps in sport should survive the exit from Communism pretty well on the argument that the national feelings in these countries-except perhaps Russia-were not locked into the Communist regimes, and so did not suffer when the regimes fell (Joppke , Weiner ). On the other hand, other scholars have argued that the Communist period nearly eradicated national feeling in these countries (Wozniakowski ).
Among the English-language countries, science should be a special source of pride, both because of their success at it and because it provides a good vehicle for national feelings in multi-ethnic societies (Kelley ), which they mostly are. They have successful martial traditions, although the withdrawal from the colonies in the early post-World War II period may have diminished pride in the military in Britain. None of the English-language countries is distinguished in the visual arts or music, although certainly there were great achievements in literature in the late medieval and early modern periods. Their individualist tradition should mean that redistribution is felt as painful necessity rather than an achievement, and hence they would be expected to take little pride in their redistribution systems.
Also worth addressing is the question of US exceptionalism (Lipset , )-in what ways national feelings in the USA differ from the rest of the world. For example, the US retained the language, the individualistic culture, the practice of self-government, and substantial traditions of institutional design from Britain. But did its revolutionary origins leave it very different in the dimensions it emphasizes in national pride? Is it very different from other English-speaking settler countries whose separation from Britain was peaceful and relatively recent? Very different from other rich countries? The answers should help to illuminate how powerful and useful are the conceptual dimensions on which we can array countries, or whether one had best revert to a more idiopathic approach.
DATA AND MEASUREMENT
To investigate such questions, the International Social Survey Programme's - 'National Identity' survey, designed by Max Haller and Ephraim Yuchtman-Yaar (), asked questions about pride-or lack of it-in a nation's achievements in  countries. In all, there are , interviews.
These data, together with a complete specification of all analyses in the paper, are available for downloading from the internet in a form convenient for re-analysis at www.international-survey.org. 14 All  surveys use large, representative national samples. Attitude items were asked exactly in the same way in all nations, providing one of the most comparable cross-national data sets on the topic. 15 Comparisons with the national census, where available, show the surveys to be representative in age, education, occupation, and industry, although women are over-represented in several surveys (Bean , Kelley and Evans , Sikora , Zentralarchiv ).
The ISSP surveys mostly began with interviews with a stratified random sample followed by a leave-behind self-completion questionnaire with the ISSP items; several were conducted entirely by mail and some entirely by interview. Several of the mail surveys were simple random samples but the others involved various forms of clustering. Completion rates (defined as completions/(completions plus refusals)) averaged around  percent, counting losses at the interview and the drop-off stages. (For details on the sampling techniques and response rates for each country, see www.issp.org). These rates compare favourably with recent experiences in many industrial nations (e.g., the highly regarded  International Crime Victim Survey averaged  percent over  nations (van Dijk et al. ) ). The ISSP surveys are listed in the Technical Appendix.
We begin with descriptive statistics on the various domains of national pride; then assess correlations among the domains; and then use regression analysis to model the sources of national pride, and to model the impact of the different domains of national pride on national attachment. These analyses control for social differences at the individual level. The exact models are in the Technical Appendix.
RESULTS

P  S
The question asks 'How proud are you of (country name) in each of the following . . . ' followed by a list of zones of potential national pride ( Table ) . We begin with pride in science and technology.
The Germanic countries invented the research university and have a strong tradition of scientific research, but what do their people think? Most are proud of their nation's achievements in science and technology:  percent 'very proud' and fully  percent 'proud'. Only  percent say they are 'not very proud' and  percent say that they are 'not proud at all'. We summarize this compactly by the mean on a points-out-of- basis-where 'very proud' gets , and 'not proud at all' gets , with intermediate answers given scores at equal intervals in between (Evans et al. , pp. -, Wegener ). Scored in this simple way, 16 the average for Germanic countries is . Turning to other countries, the percentage for 'very proud' is highest in the USA at  percent (the mean is  points out of ). Next, although well behind, come the rest of the English-speaking countries at  percent 'very proud', and with a mean score of  points out of . The German-speaking countries and Scandinavian countries come next at  percent and  percent respectively. Next come the 'other' market economies where  percent are 'very proud' (mean of ) and the formerly Communist countries where  percent say they are 'very proud' (mean of ). These are all single-peaked, well-behaved distributions well represented by their means.
We reserve most of the theoretical discussion for the country-by-country analysis below, but there are several points that should be made here. () Contrary to the globalizing-institutions hypothesis, many people in a number of countries attach national feelings to scientific and technological advances. () The civilizing-process hypothesis receives some support and but is also undermined to an extent. The supporting result is that large majorities feel either 'proud' or 'very proud' of their nation's science in all the country groups. The undermining result is the evident differentiation among the developed country groups. In particular, the English-speaking world takes more pride in their science than do their European counterparts in the Norse-or Germanspeaking worlds, and American exceptionalism is also evident. 16 This 'equal interval' scoring is often used in attitude research and has the advantage of putting everything in a clear  to  metric. Any scoring that preserves equal intervals between answer categories (for example, Likert scoring them as , , , and ) produces identical standardized coefficients and metric coefficients that are a simple linear transformation of our coefficients. Alternative estimates that assume only the order of classes (Joreskog and Sorbom , p. ), or multinomial logit methods also preserving the order of the answer categories, in practice produce virtually identical conclusions (Kelley and Evans  P   A  L Do these patterns also hold for national pride in the arts and literature? The percentages 'very proud' of their nation's art and literature all fall into the range
 percent to  percent, with substantial majorities feeling either 'very proud' or 'proud' in all country groups ( Table ) . 17 There is less differentiation here than in the case of pride in science, both within the West and between Western and Eastern Europe. The latter result is clearly contrary to the postmaterialism hypothesis. There is no sign of American exceptionalism, and no sign that globalization is eroding the country-specific quality of at least some art and literature. It is perhaps surprising that Americans think so well of their art and literature, and that the German-speaking peoples do not think better of theirs, issues to which we shall return. It is noteworthy that the formerly Communist countries of East-Central and Eastern Europe are much prouder of the arts and literature than of their science. But the opposite is true of the Scandinavian countries, the Germanic countries, and the Anglophone countries, including the USA.
P  S Sport elicits feelings of national pride in many breasts throughout the developed world: substantial majorities feel 'proud' or 'very proud' of sport in all the country groups in the survey ( Table ) . The percentage 'very proud' ranges from  to  percent in the German-speaking countries, in Eastern Europe, and in the 'other' market economies, with the USA and Scandinavia somewhat higher at  to  percent, and the non-US Anglophone countries topping the list at  percent. Means range from lows of  to  points in the Germanic countries, and the largely Slavic-language countries of Central-East and Eastern Europe, to a high of  points in the non-US Anglophone countries.
P  E A Economic achievements are not so clearly a matter of pride (Table ) . Here the fraction of the populace feeling 'very proud' ranges from a low of  percent in the formerly Communist countries to  percent in the USA. Means range from a low of  points in the largely Slavonic-language ex-Communist countries; to averages near  in the Nordic countries and the non-US English-speaking countries; with the highest means-in the high s-among Americans and the German-speaking countries.
The postmaterialism hypothesis implies uniformly low pride in the economy, as national feelings disengage from the taken-for-granted material base. That is clearly not true, as national pride in the economy is high in the Germanic countries () and in the USA (), but very low in Scandinavia () and Eastern Europe (). Here again there is American exceptionalism, with the USA () much higher than the remainder of the English-speaking world ().
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O S  P How do groups of nations compare on various other sources of pride (Table , last panel)? First, consider the evidence on the erosion of national feeling. If national feeling were eroding, it should be low on all dimensions in all countries. For operational purposes, take low to mean below the neutral point of  on the  point scale. So defined, national pride is not low on any dimension in the USA or the other Anglophone countries. It is low on only one out of ten topics in the German-language countries (the military). The Scandinavian countries' achievements inspire little pride in the breasts of their citizens on three out of the ten topics. The peoples of the 'other market economies' do not feel much national pride in five of the ten topics. In the Eastern European countries, six of the ten topics rate less than .
Because we do not have data over time, we cannot say whether national pride is in decline, but the data certainly show that it has not disappeared. Thus, neither economic nor institutional globalization seems to have melted away national feelings.
Does pride in the armed forces follow a declining gradient across levels of development, as anticipated by the civilizing-process hypothesis? The answer seems to be 'no'. Pride in the armed forces is highest in the USA at  points out of , followed by  for the rest of the English-speaking world; next come the 'other market economies' at , then East Central and Eastern Europe at , with the Nordic and German-language countries at  and  respectively. This puts the most developed countries in the world at both ends of the spectrum of pride in the nation's martial achievements, clear evidence against the civilizing-process hypothesis. The fact that the USA stands out as exceptionally proud of their military supports the American-exceptionalism hypothesis.
the non-US English-speaking countries at , with the Americans fractionally lower at . The largely Slavonic-language countries of Eastern Europe average . The Scandinavian rating seems surprisingly low, but the recession of the early s hit hard there and various other factors may have also have (probably temporarily) shaken faith in the 'Nordic model' (Allardt ) .
The areas in which the formerly Communist countries take the most pride are their history (), arts and literature (), and sport (). The Scandinavians' top three areas are sport (), science (), and history (). The Germanlanguage countries take the most pride in their science (), sport (), and economy (). The non-US English speaking countries feel proudest of their sport (), science (), and arts and literature (). The areas of greatest pride in the USA are science (), the military (), and history (). These lists are neither completely homogeneous nor heterogeneous, recurrent themes are woven through, but are not universal. In five of the six groups, sport is among the top three, making it perhaps the most widely dispersed source of pride. The USA is partially exceptional here-science and technology and history also occur in other groups 'top three' areas, but the occurrence of the military in the top three is unique to the USA.
C  D A  P Correlations at the individual level cast light on several hypotheses. Contrary to the civilizing-process hypothesis, the correlation between pride in the armed forces and pride in science is not negative, but rather is moderately positive (.). This is also true of the correlations of martial pride and pride in art and literature (.), and of martial pride and pride in sport (.). Thus, neither between nations, nor within nations do these data provide any support for the civilizing-process hypothesis.
Similarly, there is no support here for the postmaterialist hypothesis that pride in the economy would have a negative association with pride in 'play' activities: instead, pride in the nation's economy is positively correlated with pride in science and technology (.), positively correlated with pride in the arts and literature (.), and positively correlated with national pride in sport (.). Thus, to supplement the largely negative findings at the national level, these are completely negative findings at the individual level. Economic development does not seem to turn people into aesthetes or absent-minded professors indifferent to economic success.
T I
Thus, the findings presented in Table  provide () no support for the hypothesis that globalizing institutions have eroded national feeling; () no support for the hypothesis that a globalizing economy has eroded national feelings; () no support for the hypothesis that the civilizing process would lessen pride in the military as nations develop; () no support for the hypothesis that the civilizing process would result in pride in the arts and literature being higher in more developed countries; () no support for the hypothesis that the civilizing process would result in pride in sport being higher in more developed countries; () largely negative findings as regards the postmaterialism hypothesis; () mixed findings as regards the American exceptionalism hypothesis; and () substantial support for the hypothesis of persisting cultural differences.
NATIONAL DIFFERENCES, NET OF COMPOSITION
The results presented thus far emphasize international variability. This makes it intriguing to take a closer look at the individual countries rather than just the broad country groups presented thus far-with adjustments for compositional differences among the countries to ensure that observed differences do not simply reflect their population composition. Specifically, we adjust by regression for differences in age structure, gender, education, and migration history. Details are in the Technical Appendix.
P  S  T There is diversity both between and within groups of nations on the issue of science and technology (Table , left-hand Panel). Average levels of pride in science and technology cover a -point span in the English-speaking countries, ranging from  points in Ireland to  in the USA. The UK and Irish Republic ratings are in the range found throughout northwest and central Europe- to . Ex-East Germany closely resembles ex-West Germany. Ratings in the other ex-Communist countries are concentrated in the forties and fifties, as is also the rating for the Philippines, the only developing country in the study.
Both the intensity and the content of Japanese national feeling are matters of on-going scholarly controversy (e.g. Deng , Gao , Landes , Youth Development Headquarters ), but in terms of national pride in science and technology, they are very close to other developed countries-their mean of  puts them above Italy, Spain, Germany, Norway, and Sweden.
Americans take more pride in science and technology than do the citizens of any other nation in the study. All in all, there is substantial differentiation within the developed world, lending further support to the view of persistent national variation.
Moving beyond nation-by-nation differences, several broad patterns emerge ( Table , right-hand Panel) . The greatest pride is felt by the Irish, with  points out of : they do indeed seem to see themselves as the land of poets; the Italians are not far behind. Next comes a broad, highly diverse middle group with scores in the low s: Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Japan, Latvia, New Zealand, and the USA. Next, just a little lower, comes a large lower-middle group, also diverse. It includes Russia and several other east-central European nations, as well as Spain and Britain. Towards the bottom with scores in the low s are the Scandinavian nations, despite their epic tradition, and the Philippines, the latter being especially interesting in light of its mixed linguistic heritage (Weekley ). Poland, the Netherlands, and ex-West Germany come last. On this topic the US sits anonymously in the middle.
Some of these results are surprising-for example that Britain, the land of Shakespeare and Milton-takes so little pride in its achievements in the arts and literature; that Germany with its splendid musical tradition comes so low; and that the Dutch take so little pride in the likes of Rembrandt and Vermeer with their huge influence on painting. Future research will be needed here.
Looking beyond the country-by-country results reveals a few broad patterns (Table , Panel B). English-speaking peoples generally have more pride in their nation's arts and literature, about  points more than other long-established market economies. 22 This runs counter to a hypothesis that countries in multi-national language groups would take less pride in their literature (Corse ) . The ex-Communist nations take a little more pride in their nation's arts and literature, by about  points. 23 There is a significant, but small, size effect, 20 This sample of nations blurs the distinction between poverty and Communism, since all the poorer European nations were in the Communist bloc. The only poor non-communist nation is the Philippines. 21 We are inclined to think that these are substantive differences rather than matters of translation that make the English-speakers tend to use the top end of the scale and the Slavic-language speakers the low end of the scale, because the international differences vary among the remaining topics in subsequent tables.
22 Does this reflect the large pool of English-speaking writers compared to the small pool of, for example, Norwegian or Bulgarian writers? The fact that large nations do not, in general, take greater pride in their literature argues against it. 23 The fact that ex-communist, mostly Slavic-language countries are more proud of their arts and literature whereas they were less proud of their science allays concern that translation difficulties might have disproportionately led the Slavic-language answers to tilt towards the negative end of the scale. Similarly, the fact that the English language advantage is only one-third the size that it was on science and technology means that the observed differences cannot be dismissed as mere translation issues.
with denizens of small countries taking more pride in their arts and literature; that is consistent with the claim that small nations concentrate their national feelings in non-comparable areas (Matthews ), but the parallel finding that smaller nations are also keener on their science and technology runs counter to that claim.
A  S
Here again there is very substantial international diversity ( Table ) . Even after adjustment for differences in population composition, scores cover a huge range from  to , with great differentiation evident within most of the country groups. New Zealanders and the Irish take the greatest pride in their nation's sporting success, with adjusted scores in the middle s, followed by the Bulgarians and Australians in the high s. Next comes a diverse group with scores in the middle s: Austria, Norway, Slovenia, and the USA. Other nations are yet lower: Britain, Canada, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Russia with scores in the s. East Germans are at this level too-their signal successes in international sport under the former Communist regime perhaps offset by drug scandals. The Philippines, several east-central European nations, and West Germany are toward the bottom. Poland comes last.
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There are some interesting broader patterns in these data (Table , Panel B). Most strikingly, citizens of smaller nations are noticeably prouder of their nation's sporting achievements, about  points higher than citizens of large nations. English-speaking peoples generally have more pride in their nation's sports achievements as well, about  points more than citizens of other long-established market economies. Surprisingly, ex-Communist nations take less pride in their nation's sporting successes, by about  points.
P  E A
Citizens of the various nations differ greatly in how much pride they take in their country's economic performance (Table , right-hand Panel). After adjustment, the scores range from , on average, among Hungarians to  among Americans. Americans and the Irish take the greatest pride in their nation's economic performance, with scores in the high s. The high Irish score is, perhaps, a testimony to the effects of international redistribution via supra-national organizations (here, the European Union) enhancing national feelings! West Germany is only a fraction behind. 25 Austrians, the Japanese, 24 Here again, the finding of diversity is contrary to the globalizing-institutions hypothesis, the globalizingeconomy hypothesis, the civilizing-process hypothesis or the postmaterialism hypothesis. 25 Some have worried that the intense focus of German national feeling in the postwar period on economic success would make life doubly troublesome during inevitable economic downturns (Pan ). The ISSP data show that Germans are, indeed, proud of their economy, but they take pride in other things, too, so, contrary to these concerns, they have not put all their eggs in one basket.
T  Pride in the nation's achievements in sports and in its economic achievements Panel A: Raw means; means adjusted by regression for differences between nations in their population's age, gender, education, and migration history; and significance of differences between nations (USA=reference category). By and large, citizens of richer nations take more pride in their nation's economic performance, in line with prior findings that people's perceptions of the macroeconomic situation are largely correct (Hibbs ) and also in line with the economic globalization hypothesis that people rate their nation's economy in terms of a single international hierarchy, rather than in terms of local hierarchies. For example, the USA and Germany both top the rankings and are among the richest nations in the world, while Russia and the east-central European nations are both low in the rankings and objectively poor.
But absolute levels of prosperity are not the whole story: the direction of change may matter too. The Irish are bursting with economic pride despite being much poorer than the USA and West Germany, the other countries that share their exalted ranking. The Irish economy has grown rapidly in recent years, amply assisted by subsidies from the European Community, and that may well be the reason. And at the other extreme Sweden is near the bottom of the rankings despite being much richer than comparably pessimistic nations like Russia and Latvia. However, the Swedish economy, previously a widely admired model of social democratic economic organization, had done poorly over the last decade.
26 So economic growth may be one of the things that gives citizens pride in their nation's economy, while economic stagnation undermines pride even in nations that remain objectively wealthy.
But economic growth and decline do not tell the whole story either. One of the most surprising results is the pride Filipinos take in their nation's economic achievements despite their nation's poverty and unremarkable growth rate.
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Their GNP per capita is only around  percent of US levels, and growing at a modest . percent per year. 28 Other nations near their level of economic pride are mostly around  percent of US GNP. This would seem to be a striking piece of evidence against the economic-globalization hypothesis that all 26 Over the decade -, high income economies grew at an average of about  percent a year (World Bank , p. ). Ireland did much better, growing at over  percent while Sweden declined fractionally at −. percent a year. 27 It is all the more striking in light of scholars' arguments that the Philippines' history as a source country for sojourner lanor migrants has left a legacy of national feelings of shame as regards the economy (Aguilar ).
28 World Bank (, p. ). Growth is for the period -.
will be measuring themselves against the richest nations in the newly globalized market.
The most striking general pattern in pride in the economy is that citizens of formerly Communist nations take a grim view of their nations' economic achievements, fully  points below other, more prosperous, nations. This is consistent with the view that Communism's failure was primarily economic.
T S  N D
Further evidence of the diversity of national feelings is provided by the fact that there are substantial differences among nations in the degree of pride they take in various activities. Differences among nations are smallest in the arts, larger in science and in sport, and largest in economic performance. Most nations find something to be proud of in their arts and literature. The difference between those who think they have the least to admire (Poland, West Germany, and the Netherlands, with adjusted scores just under ) and those with the most to be proud of (Ireland, Italy, and Bulgaria, with unadjusted scores around ) is  points out of . We suspect that the arts are sufficiently numerous, and styles sufficiently diverse, that almost every nation can excel in something; while literature and poetry in the local languages has an in-built advantage over writings in foreign languages.
Differences in science and technology are larger. Countries with few achievements in science and technology to feel proud of (the Philippines, Slovakia, and Latvia, with scores around ) are fully  points behind the leaders (the USA, Australia, and New Zealand, with scores around ). While not so diverse as arts and literature, science has many separate fields in which a country can excel (for example, medicine in Australia).
Differences in sport are about the same size (with Poland, West Germany, and Slovakia at the bottom scoring around  compared to Ireland, New Zealand, and Bulgaria scoring close to ). Sports, like science, has niches for many countries-rugby in New Zealand, weight-lifting in Bulgaria, or skiing in Norway, for example.
It is with respect to the economy that differences among nations are largest. Some countries feel that they do very poorly (Sweden, Russia, and Hungary, with adjusted scores around ), while others do well (the USA, Germany, and Ireland, with scores near ). The difference between top and bottom is fully  points. 
WHO IS PROUD OF THEIR NATION'S ACHIEVEMENTS?
Thus far, we have focused on differences among nations, and on national diversity adjusted for differences in population characteristics, but some of the hypotheses also have implications for social differences among individuals. We now turn to these issues ( Table ) .
A
If globalization reduces national feeling, then older people ought to be more proud of arts and literature, science, sport, and their economy than are younger people, according to the generational replacement or cohort replacement hypothesis (e.g. Abramson and Inglehart ) . If the civilizing process is at work, then younger people ought to be more proud than older people of arts and literature, science, sport, and their economy. If the postmaterialist hypothesis well describes national feeling, then younger people ought to be more proud of arts and literature, science, sport, but older people should be more proud of the economy.
In fact, older people are more proud than the young of their nation's science and technology, its arts and literature, and its economy, but old and young are equally proud of sport (Table ) . Thus, three of the four age effects are positive, as the globalization hypotheses would predict, but their variation in size and the null association between age and pride in sport are contrary to the uniform positive association anticipated by the globalization hypotheses. Even more dramatically, these results are opposite in direction to predictions of the civilizing-process and the postmaterialist hypotheses. On the hypothesis of US exceptionalism, the age differences discovered by the regression analysis are larger in the USA than among the people of the rest of our sample of nations, indicating either a different aging process, or a sharper historical change there.
G
Gender differences are variable and mostly small ( Table ) . Men and women take equal pride in their nation's science and technology, its sport, and its economy, but men are less proud than women of their nation's arts and literature (standardized regression coefficient of −.). These results are consistent with prior complex and relatively weak findings on gender differences in national feelings (Moghadam ) . Gender differences are more evident in the USA.
E
Several of the hypotheses lead to clear predictions about the effects of education. The globalizing-institutions hypothesis implies that, as the educated are better informed about supra-and transnational institutions, they will be more likely to employ an international perspective and hence will take less pride than their less educated peers who make only local comparisons. In concrete terms, that suggests that education should have negative effects on pride in science and technology, on pride in the economy, and on pride in sport, but education should have no effect on pride in the arts and literature where comparisons at all levels of education will be local. The civilizing-process hypothesis suggests positive effects of education in all these domains. The postmaterialism hypothesis suggests positive effects of education on pride in science, on pride in the arts, and on pride in sport, but a negative effect on pride in the economy.
In fact, education has a very small negative effect on pride in science and technology, a small positive effect on pride in the arts and literature, a middle-sized negative effect on national pride in sport, and a small negative effect on pride in the economy (Table ) . This pattern of results is consonant with none of the hypotheses. Here, the effects in the USA are greater in magnitude, and sometimes even different in direction, in particular, education having a middle-sized positive effect on pride in science (in contrast to the small negative effect elsewhere).
E  F C
Immigration
The globalization hypotheses suggest that immigration undermines national feeling, suggesting that national pride should be lower on all dimensions among immigrants (Bader ) . The other hypotheses have no clear implications concerning immigrants. Prior research suggests that connections of ethnicity with national feelings are complex (e.g. de la Garza et al. , Sidanius et al. ) . 30 In the  nations studied here, immigrants are just as proud as natives of their adopted nation's science and technology and of its technology, but a little less proud of its arts and literature and of its sport ( Table ) .
Rootedness
The globalizing-institutions hypotheses suggests that staying in the town of one's birth may indicate limited horizons, and thus encourage local comparisons, thereby enhancing national pride on all dimensions. In fact, the regression analysis shows that those who remain in the city of their birth are no more (and no less) proud than their more mobile peers of their nation's science and technology, or of its arts and literature, or of its economy, but are a little more proud of its sport ( Table ) .
Exposure to foreign culture
The globalizing-institutions hypothesis and postmaterialism hypothesis would see exposure to foreign lands as a mechanism undermining national feeling, and prior research suggests that it undermines the strength of national identity (Kelley ) . Indeed, spending time abroad might engender feelings of national shame among labor exporting countries (Aguilar ). In the event, having lived abroad has no effect on national pride in science, in the arts and literature, or in the economy (Table ) , but slightly decreases pride in sport. This pattern of results is not consistent with the expectations of the globalizing-institutions hypothesis and of the postmaterialism hypothesis.
A E
There is some evidence in favour of US exceptionalism in that some of the demographic and background effects in the USA are distinctive. For example, 30 Research on ethnicity, immigration and national feelings has focused on attachment rather than pride, but the evidence there is mixed. US evidence is that strong ethnic attachment tends to be negatively associated with national identity (Bobo ) , but that may not be true internationally (Dowley and Silver  the effects of age on pride in science, on pride in the arts, and on pride in the economy are larger in the USA (standardized regression coefficients of . to ., compared to . to . elsewhere). And on sport, age has a small to medium-sized positive effect in the USA compared to a very small negative effect in the rest of the world. Furthermore, education has a much more important effect on pride in science in the USA than in the rest of the world.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF PRIDE
Does it matter whether people feel proud of their nation? We investigate one important possibility: that pride influences emotional attachment to the nation. Emotional attachment is measured by a direct question in a series asking about attachment to one's neighborhood, town, state, and nation (Table ) .
Most people feel close to their nation,  percent saying they are 'very close' and another  percent saying 'close'. Despite Americans' reputation for patriotism, they are not, in fact, unusually attached to their nation: in the other  nations in the study, attachment averages , somewhat higher than Americans' average of . Means range from the low s for the Germanic countries and the USA, to the middle s for other Anglophone countries, and Scandinavia, to a high of  for the post-Communist countries of east-central and Eastern Europe. At least on this question, national identity/attachment was alive and well (for better or for worse) in the mid-s throughout this range of countries.
F I A  O' N
We argue that pride in a nation's achievements may increase people's feelings of attachment to the nation-that achievements can lead to pride and pride to affection. However a plausible alternative would be that the causal link is the other way around: feeling close to one's nation could lead one to take an over-optimistic view of its achievements in science, the economy, literature, and sports, and hence take false pride in them. While causal influences probably go both ways in practice, we would argue that, at a minimum, a substantial fraction of them go from achievement to pride and thence to attachment. There is clear evidence for this with respect to pride in economic achievement, where good objective measures of a nation's economic achievements is available to bring empirical evidence to bear on this difficult question (Kelley and Evans ) .
On the assumption that pride is at least in part a cause of attachments, it seems that pride in the nation's scientific achievements, pride in the arts and literature, pride in sport, and pride in the economy can all influence national attachment/identity, but the patterns vary quite a bit among groups of nations ( Table ) . Let us take as a baseline the large nations that are not English-speaking and are not ex-Communist. Among them, pride in science, pride in the arts, pride in sport, and pride in the economy all significantly enhance emotional attachment to the nation.
The effects of pride in sport and in the economy are the same in the English-speaking countries as in the baseline group of nations. But pride in science has about twice the impact on emotional attachment in the anglophone lands that it does in the baseline group. By contrast, pride in the arts has only about half the impact on national attachment in the English-language countries that it has in the baseline group.
In the ex-Communist nations, the impact of pride in science, pride in the arts, and pride in the economy on national attachment is the same as in the baseline countries. But pride in sport has no impact, in contrast to the significant effect in the baseline countries.
In small nations, the connections of pride to attachment are the same as in the baseline nations for science, art, and the economy. But pride in sport is much more important to small countries-the effect there is twice the size it is in the baseline countries.
Finally, older people tend to be more attached to their nations. Immigrants are a little less attached. There are no significant differences between old and young, or between the well-educated and the poorly educated.
DISCUSSION
Many influential hypotheses concerning the impact of globalization on national feeling find no support in these data-data which cover a large portion of the developed world. 
 Globalization
Contrary to all arguments about economic and institutional globalization eroding national feeling, we find that national pride continues strongly in all  of the countries in our study. Large majorities in each of the  countries derive feelings of national pride from their science and technology, their arts and literature, their sport, and their history. 31 Nations are more diverse in the degree of pride they take in their economies, their armed forces, the way democracy works in their country, their redistribution/social security systems, their fair and equal treatment of all groups in society, and the country's political influence in the world. Importantly, in this diversity many values are high, and there is no sign that countries which are more integrated internationally take less pride 31 That there is so much pride in history may be surprising in some instances to an outsider, but it is to be remembered that military disasters can be defined as heroic defeats (Olberg , Goode ) , and that countries invest substantially in establishing public celebrations and in writing and re-writing schoolbooks to emphasize different facets of history (Waldstreicher , Weekley , Zadja ). in these areas. Moreover, feelings of attachment or closeness to the nation predominate in each of the  countries. All in all, the survey evidence is strongly counter to the view that economic or institutional globalization has eroded national feelings in the developed world, at least as of the mid-s.
Only one hypothesis about economic globalization-that as tariffs fall and a world market emerges people will evaluate their country's economic performance in terms of a single worldwide hierarchy-receives support.
 The civilizing process
The civilizing-process hypothesis sees pride in the armed forces at its peak with the establishment of the modern nation-states in Europe, with nations subsequently learning (unevenly and with some backsliding) to keep their claws sheathed, and, in parallel, citizens re-focusing national feelings away from the military and onto areas such as the sciences, the arts, and literature. However, this hypothesis receives no support.
 Postmaterialism
The postmaterialist hypothesis that below a certain economic threshold, countries focus on economic matters, and above that threshold they focus on the arts, science, and sport as expressions and enactments of national feeling receives no support in these  nations. Nor do feelings of attachment/closeness to one's country vary with development, seeming rather to reflect persistent cultural differences and, sometimes, particular histories.
 Cultural diversity
The results strongly favour the persistent-diversity hypothesis. For example, among the developed nations, the English-speaking nations differ both from the Norse and the Germanic countries in their pride in science and technology and in their arts and literature, but not in their sport, while both Germanic and English-speaking countries take more pride in their economies than do the Scandinavian countries (in the mid-s). Non-English speaking nations gain more from their achievements in literature and the arts. Moreover, pride leads to warmer feelings about the nation more strongly in those countries than in Anglophone nations.
It seems likely that not all the diversity we observe is persistent, though. Rather some of it seems to reflect particular historical circumstances that may change. For example the very dismal feelings of Swedes about their economy in this period presumably reflect severely disappointed expectations as well as a mediocre performance recently. The striking lack of pride in their redistribution system in the ex-Communist countries presumably reflects the struggle of establishing largely market-compatible systems in relatively poor countries. And the German military still languishes in the shadow of Nazi horror.
Perhaps the best summary is that cross-national diversity is clearly present in these data, but it is not clear what particular situational factors predominate, nor is it clear to what degree deep-rooted cultural differences influence national feelings. The fact that some differences are observable across language groups suggests that enduring influences play at least some role. That is a beginning, but it thus far tells us nothing about what underlying dimensions generate those differences among cultures.
The only dimension we've yet teased out is a structural rather than a cultural one, namely that 'size matters': citizens of small countries take a great deal more pride in sport, and a little more pride in science and art than do their peers in large countries, even net of differences in their social composition and language group. Moreover, the impact of pride in sport on national attachment is twice as large in small nations as in more populous ones, even net of differences in social composition and language group. It suggests that, at least in smaller nations, public support for sports may produce a genuine public benefit.
 American exceptionalism
American exceptionalism is a particularly well-theorized instance of the crossnational diversity question, but the evidence here is mixed. For example, the English-speaking nations as a group take an unusually large amount of pride in their science and technology, but Americans do so even more than denizens of other Anglophone countries. Moreover, the intra-national processes generating pride in science are somewhat distinct in the USA where scientific pride is differentiated by education and gender to a larger degree than is true of other countries. But they are not fully distinct, for in the USA as in other countries, pride in science is shared equally by immigrants and the native born, by cosmopolitans who have lived abroad and their peers who have always dwelt in their native land, by deep-rooted folk who never leave the city of their birth and by rolling stones who gather no moss. On many of the other topics we examined, too, the summary would be neither simply pro nor con the American exceptionalism hypothesis. Rather, the best verdict would be 'American partial-exceptionalism'.
But continuing cultural diversity among nations is our most striking finding. It is to the substantive dimensions underlying the differentiation among language groups that future research might profitably turn.
TECHNICAL APPENDIX D
The ISSP participants for this module 32 were Australia (International Social Science Survey/Australia (Kelley and Evans b)); Austria (Institut für Soziologie, Graz 32 For the many countries that have contributed several surveys, we reference only the most recent.
M
The measurement of national pride, and of feelings of attachment to the nation, are described in the text. The questions were all asked in exactly the same wording, and exactly the same sequence, in all  nations.
The demographic and background variables are conventional. Age is in years. Education is in years of schooling. Male, immigrant, born in current city of residence, and experience living abroad are all / indicator variables.
M
The model of Panel A in Tables  and  is:
Pride=
where Nation j is a set of  dummy variables for the nations in the study; the USA is the omitted or reference category. Parameter estimates are by ordinary least squares regression. Significance tests in column  of the tables are from these dummy variables.
The adjusted values in column  of the tables are obtained by evaluation of Equation  at the mean of the control variables for the USA. Individual subscripts are suppressed for simplicity. The model in Panel B of the tables replaces j Nation j with variables measuring the
